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Abstract
Political support is a multidimensional construct encompassing evaluations of
political leaders and institutions (specific support) as well as adherence to basic
regime principles (diffuse support). Scholars have traditionally assumed that
diffuse and specific support are driven by different forces and evolve largely in-
dependently. Prior empirical work, however, has struggled to untangle the two
support dimensions and focused predominantly on cross-national differences,
ignoring their dynamics. This paper develops an analytical and empirical ap-
proach to examine the levels and dynamic interplay of both support dimensions
and estimate their determinants, applying it to South American democracies
between 1996 and 2015. Contrary to received wisdom, we show that both
dimensions are quite volatile and closely linked in this region. In particular,
negative economic shocks not only undermine support for government actors,
but also fuel democratic disenchantment. Nonetheless, while regime support is
rather fickle in South America, it can be ultimately resistant to performance
fluctuations.
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1 Introduction
Starting from Easton (1965)’s seminal work, a large body of literature has highlighted
the multidimensional nature of political support, recognizing that individual citizens
may be “(...) more or less supportive of each dimension” (Booth and Seligson, 2009:
10). In particular, citizens may display different levels of diffuse support for the core
values and procedures embodied in the political regime, as well as varying degrees of
specific support for public officials and institutions.
The notions of diffuse and specific support are neither observationally nor concep-
tually equivalent. The latter is circumscribed to specific office-holders or government
bodies, and based on evaluations of their actions and decisions. The diffuse dimension,
on the other hand, is seen as determined by deeply-held attachments to democratic
values and norms (Easton, 1965). Traditionally, scholars have posited that these two
dimensions are only loosely connected. While specific support is deemed to shift
constantly in response to the policies and outputs produced by the political system,
support for regime principles is assumed essentially impervious to short-term changes
in performance or contextual circumstances (Easton, 1975).
The two support dimensions, however, are likely to be more closely intertwined in
new or consolidating democracies. In societies without a vast reservoir of diffuse sup-
port to help tide over hard times, the political system’s inability to respond to citizens’
demands may not only undermine trust in politicians and authoritative institutions,
but also erode confidence in democratic ideals. In such contexts, economic downturns
or disappointing policy outcomes – which in more established polities would simply
prompt voters to punish incumbents at the ballot box – may lead citizens to question
not only the competence of elected officials or the effectiveness of the state apparatus,
but also the regime’s legitimacy (Katz and Levin, 2016).
Is diffuse support in emerging democracies more volatile than previously assumed?
Do the diffuse and specific dimensions respond to similar forces in these settings?
More concretely, do policy failures or poor – e.g., economic – performances “flow
upwards,” affecting not only specific support for those responsible for these outcomes
1
but also popular outlooks towards democracy? How does the connection between such
critical junctures and the two support dimensions vary across individuals, polities,
and over time? Answering these questions requires taking into consideration the
multifaceted and dynamic character of political support, discriminating between its
components while still accounting for their potential co-variation. Furthermore, as
noted by Gilley (2009), a long-term perspective is necessary to understand whether
swings in diffuse and specific support reflect trendless oscillations or structural breaks.
Prior research, however, has struggled to deal with the multidimensional nature
of support and to disentangle its components using standard survey instruments pre-
dominant in empirical work (Gershtenson and Plane, 2012). In addition, most com-
parative studies have focused solely on explaining cross-national variations, largely
ignoring the temporal dimension (Bargsted, Somma, and Castillo, 2017). To over-
come these shortcomings, we develop a novel analytical framework and empirical
strategy to study political support. Our approach distinguishes substantively mean-
ingful “types” of citizens based on their underlying support for political actors and
institutions as well as on their adherence to regime principles, employing a two-step
method to classify individuals into these categories and examine the correlates of sup-
port. The first step integrates Bayesian latent class analysis and supervised machine
learning to identify survey respondents’ positions on the two support dimensions. In
the second step, we simultaneously estimate the individual and contextual determi-
nants of type assignment and contrast their influence on each dimension. We can
thus identify groups of citizens that vary in their levels of diffuse and specific support
and uncover the key factors explaining their prevalence and evolution.
We apply our approach to the analysis of political support in South America be-
tween 1996 and 2015. Roughly thirty years after the “third wave of democratization,”
attitudes towards political elites and commitment to democratic tenets vary dramat-
ically within this region (Booth and Seligson, 2009). Along with these disparities
in mass political opinions, South American countries exhibit substantial differences
in institutional features, regime performance and socio-demographic characteristics,
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allowing an in-depth examination of rival explanations of support while keeping unob-
servable – e.g., cultural – factors relatively constant. Our analysis also sheds light on
the short- and long-term impact of the economic and political changes experienced
by the subcontinent over the last two decades, marked by cyclical alternations of
booms and recessions and the collapse of several countries’ party systems (Mainwar-
ing, 2006). Examining the temporal response curves of diffuse and specific support
to these events provides valuable insights into the dynamic interplay between both
dimensions, addressing an important lacuna in the field.
2 Varieties of Political Support: Typology and De-
terminants
Our classification of varieties of political support builds on Easton (1965)’s distinction
between diffuse support for democratic principles and specific support for political ac-
tors and institutions. The combination of the two support dimensions makes possible
a simple categorization of individuals’ assessments of fundamental and functional as-
pects of democracy. As seen in Table 1, this classification defines four types of citizens,
which we label satisfied democrats, dissatisfied democrats, anti-system and alienated.
The typology can be justified both theoretically and empirically.
Table 1: Dimensions and Types of Support
Diffuse Support
High Low
High Satisfied Anti-system
Specific Democrats
Support
Low Dissatisfied Alienated
Democrats
The distinction between satisfied and dissatisfied democrats, which captures dif-
ferences in attitudes towards the actors and institutions of the political system among
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citizens with high levels of attachment to democratic norms, is grounded on prior work
within the Eastonian theoretical framework. Klingemann (1999) tags citizens who are
convinced democrats but nonetheless critical of the workings of the democratic process
as “dissatisfied democrats.” The same basic notion underlies Norris (1999)’s concep-
tualization of “critical citizens” and Linde (2004)’s definition of “doubtful democrats.”
Drawing on this tradition, we classify individuals with high levels of diffuse support
but low levels of specific support as dissatisfied democrats, while satisfied democrats
refers to those who score high on the two dimensions.
Because much of this pioneering literature focused on established democracies,
where adherence to the democratic ideal is nearly universal (Klingemann, 1999; Nor-
ris, 1999), the types in the second column of Table 1 have been subject to less the-
oretical development. Nevertheless, baseline diffuse or regime support can be quite
limited in some fledgling democracies. For instance, only slightly more than half of
South Americans at the turn of the century agreed that democracy was the best form
of government (Hagopian, 2005).1
Low levels of diffuse support are not incompatible with strong support for specific
political actors, though. In fact, “anti-system appeals” (Hagopian, 2005: 354) from
politicians with dubious democratic credentials are likely to mobilize mass support in
these settings, as illustrated by the recent history of several South American coun-
tries. In Peru, Fujimori’s decision to dissolve Congress and suspend the Constitution
in 1992 was backed by a large segment of the population, who saw him as an effec-
tive leader capable of curbing hyperinflation and defeating the guerrilla insurgency –
something deemed impossible within the constraints of democratic politics (Levitsky
and Cameron, 2003). Similarly, the 2002 election in Ecuador brought Lucio Gutie´rrez
into office, an army colonel who few years earlier had led a revolt against a discred-
ited but constitutional government. More generally, the rise to power of candidates
like Hugo Cha´vez in Venezuela or Evo Morales in Bolivia reveals that citizens may
support certain political figures – and the government bodies created or co-opted by
1The corresponding figure in established democracies was above 90% (Klingemann, 1999).
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them - despite their apparent disregard for democratic procedures. This is the type
of “anti-system views” (Dalton, 1999: 75) we would find in the upper-right corner of
Table 1. Of course, people disillusioned with democracy may also disapprove of all
politicians and representative institutions. Following Torcal and Montero (2006), we
tag these individuals with low levels of both diffuse and specific support as alienated.2
Together, the distribution of the four types of citizens will determine the aggregate
levels of diffuse and specific support in a polity and condition their evolution over time.
In this direction, the preponderance of anti-system types may not only facilitate the
success of leaders with questionable attitudes toward democracy, but also embolden
them to dismantle checks and balances and further corrode the regime’s foundations.
At the other extreme, where satisfied or even dissatisfied democrats predominate,
regime support is more likely to be inoculated from temporary flaws in the functioning
of the institutions of political representation.
2.1 Correlates of support types
What are the macro- and micro-level factors that determine whether an individual is a
satisfied or dissatisfied democrat, whether she turns to anti-system options or becomes
politically alienated? Previous work identified three main explanations for cross-
national and temporal variations in political support: institutional, performance-
based, and socio-demographic (Norris, 1999; Segovia, 2008).3
The first explanation maintains that political support is primarily a function of
institutional arrangements. Two aspects of the institutional design figure prominently
in the literature: the overall quality of democratic institutions, and the nature of
the mechanisms linking public preferences to the political decision-making process
– above all, the electoral rules and the characteristics of the party system (Freitag
2These authors draw a distinction between political disaffection and alienation, arguing that the
former implies a general distrust of politics but not, like the latter, a critical view of democracy.
3Some authors also emphasize the relevance of “culture” in molding political support, although
others downplay its significance (Mishler and Rose, 2005). Operationalizing cultural values for
empirical analysis is notoriously difficult, since these are fundamentally unmeasurable. We side-
step this issue by studying countries with similar cultural backgrounds while accounting for the
geographical and temporal correlation of political opinions.
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and Bu¨hlmann, 2009; Norris, 1999). Norris (1999) contends that regime support is
stronger in countries with “better democracies.” Although measuring the quality of
democracy is far from straightforward, the protection of political and civil rights are
basic democratic tenets, and the extent to which they are guaranteed in practice is
an indicator of the level of democratization of a polity (Booth and Seligson, 2009).
Following this logic, safeguarding these rights is not only intrinsically valuable, but
also instrumental in preserving and enhancing diffuse support (Payne, Zovato, and
Mateo, 2007). Additionally, extant research indicates that in countries where political
opposition is censored, rights to protest limited and law enforcement unable to prevent
(political) actors from abusing their position, people tend to be more cynical about
incumbents and the operation of state entities as well (Hagopian, 2005).
Scholars also agree that institutional configurations that allow a broader set of
societal interests to be represented in the decision-making process and that promote
accountable and responsive governance are likely to foster confidence in authorities
and government bodies. In this sense, and building on Freitag and Bu¨hlmann (2009),
satisfaction with the workings of democracy is expected to be positively correlated
with the proportionality of the electoral system. If citizens believe that the rules of the
democratic game allow adequate representation of their interests, they may develop
greater faith in the system and its outcomes (Norris, 1999). But the effectiveness
of the political system and public satisfaction with its performance may suffer if
proportionality coincides with a highly fragmented party system. Norris (1999) argues
that political support will be highest in multi-party systems that present citizens
with a reasonable range of policy choices, enabling them to effectively use elections
to “throw the rascals out” while avoiding political stalemate.
Besides the number of parties, their institutionalization may affect assessments
of the functioning of the political system as well. Strong and stable parties make
democracy “workable,” facilitating governability and rendering it easier for voters
to hold public officials accountable. More generally, institutionalized party systems
play a key role channeling political discontent and limiting the space available to
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anti-system candidates (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003). By contrast, when parties are
weak or non-institutionalized, competing or conflicting interest may fail to find rep-
resentation in the electoral arena, and citizens might choose to back non-democratic
alternatives instead.
While these institutional features tend to be persistent and thus expected to ac-
count for cross-national differences in levels of support at given moments in time,
performance-based explanations are better suited to account for changes in support
occurring over time. The vast retrospective voting literature (see Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier, 2000, and the references therein) has demonstrated that public judgments
of political leaders are strongly correlated with their (real or perceived) ability to man-
age the economy, as captured by objective macro-economic indicators – per capita
GDP, growth, unemployment, inflation – as well as by subjective measures of eco-
nomic satisfaction. Performance, however, need not be narrowly defined in purely
economic terms. Social policy outcomes and the outputs of the welfare state, for
instance, also impinge on opinions about the political system’s capacity to protect its
citizens and meet popular demands – e.g., for public goods and socio-economic inclu-
sion (Freitag and Bu¨hlmann, 2009; Mainwaring, 2006). Although performance-based
evaluations are intrinsic to Easton (1965)’s definition of specific support, Katz and
Levin (2016) show that disappointing policy outcomes can sometimes erode support
for democracy – especially in post-transitional regimes, where the “reservoir of good
will” that helps build tolerance for performance deficits is typically shallower.
Based on these arguments, then, satisfied democrats should prevail in contexts in
which political and civil liberties are protected, institutional arrangements enhance
opportunities for political participation while overcoming gridlock, and governments
are able solve their citizens’ most pressing problems. Dissatisfied democrats, in turn,
should be relatively more plentiful where basic democratic rights are effectively guar-
anteed but power-sharing agreements are less equitable, the political system is un-
responsive or ineffective, and authorities are unable to promote the general welfare
and provide people with key economic and social resources. Where both the legal-
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institutional framework and political establishment are weak and elites are incapable
of successfully administering economic and social policy, anti-system and alienated
types should be more common. Their relative weight would depend on the severity
of the political system’s under-performance and its power to resist the encroachment
of anti-party outsiders promising to fulfill neglected needs.
Individuals’ political beliefs and personal traits also color their evaluations of
fundamental and functional aspects of democracy. Listhaug (1995) finds that citi-
zens who are politically close to the incumbents are more likely to support office-
holders and government agencies than individuals affiliated to opposition candidates
or parties. This is hardly a surprising result. However, ideological leanings can have
implications for diffuse support as well: Seligson (2007) reports that, in Latin Amer-
ica, people who self-identify as leftist are less likely to favor democracy as the best
form of government. In addition, better-educated individuals have been shown to
be more likely to support democracy, but also more critical of politicians and gov-
ernment (Dalton, 2005; Magalha˜es, 2013). Social capital theory, in turn, has found
that inter-personal trust correlates positively with confidence in representative in-
stitutions, although its relationship to diffuse support is more tenuous (Mishler and
Rose, 2005). These individual characteristics will condition or moderate the influence
of the contextual (institutional, performance-related) factors and, together, shape the
distribution of support types and their dynamics within and between countries.
3 Political Support in South America: Background
and Context
The countries covered in our analysis – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela – are all formally electoral democ-
racies with constitutional separation of powers and presidential forms of government.
Almost all of them – with the exceptions of Colombia and Venezuela – transitioned
to democracy in the last 30 years, after the dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s.
In the following decades, democracy became largely consolidated in some of these
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nations while enduring major threats and setbacks in others. Building on Mainwar-
ing and Hagopian (2005), South American polities can be classified in four broad
groups based on the overall quality of their democratic institutions. A first group
comprises Chile and Uruguay, the two countries with the most ingrained and robust
democratic traditions. Both nations had a legacy of well-functioning political and
legal institutions and socially rooted parties that had managed to survive the dicta-
torial intermission, which facilitated the reconstruction of the political system and
the recovery of public confidence in it (Jones, 2012).
In a second group we have Argentina and Brazil, two cases of “(...) surprising
success in democratization” in view of their turbulent political histories and weak
democratic track records (Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005: 10). Since 1983, Argentina
has enjoyed the longest ever period of uninterrupted competitive elections. It is true
that trust in state institutions plummeted between 2001 and 2003, when the country
suffered one of the most severe recessions in its history. Still, Levitsky (2005) argues
that the fact that the political system was able to weather the crisis without reverting
to authoritarian patterns is proof of the resilience of Argentina’s democracy. Brazil
has also been able to sustain a relatively stable regime despite numerous challenges,
such as the impeachments of Presidents Collor de Mello in 1992 and Dilma Rousseff
in 2016, and – more recently – the popular outcry over the “Car Wash” corruption
scandal. As pointed out by Weyland (2005), though, the political establishment has
been able to solve or contain these crises within the institutional framework.
By contrast, the third group includes crisis-ridden polities that underwent episodes
of near- or outright regime breakdown in the 1990s and 2000s. Mainwaring and
Hagopian (2005) identify Fujimori’s 1992 executive coup in Peru as the only clear
example of authoritarian involution in the subcontinent. Episodes of political insta-
bility were also recurrent in Paraguay – including coup attempts in 1996 and 2000 -
and Ecuador, where three consecutive presidents were ousted between 1997 and 2005.
In Bolivia, the process of institution-building initiated in the 1980s was brought to a
halt in 2003, when the democratically elected president and his successor were forced
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to resign amidst a profound social and governability crisis. Democratic instability
in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru was accompanied by the collapse of the old party sys-
tems, paving the way to power of political outsiders governing in an anti-institutional
manner (Mainwaring, 2006).
Venezuela fits the previous category in many respects. Nonetheless, like Colom-
bia, it can be better depicted as an example of regime erosion, rather than break-
down. Once a vibrant and stable democracy, Venezuela experienced the demise of
its long-standing but increasingly inefficient and unresponsive party system in the
late 1990s. After Hugo Cha´vez was voted into office in 1998, mechanisms of demo-
cratic accountability were removed and all-encompassing powers concentrated in the
president (Coppedge, 2005). In the case of Colombia, the decline in the quality of
democracy can be traced to the state’s inability to guarantee the constitutional or-
der and safeguard civil liberties, as demonstrated by the country’s appalling human
rights record. Although the state’s fragility has deep historical roots, governance
problems were exacerbated after the 1991 Constitutional reform, which weakened ex-
ecutive power and undermined political representation at a time when drug lords and
guerrilla groups intensified their siege of democracy (Bejarano and Pizarro, 2005).
The ten countries also display differences in their electoral systems. The rules to
choose the head of state include plurality in Paraguay and Venezuela, majority runoff
(in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay), and runoff with reduced
thresholds (i.e., below 50%) in Argentina and Ecuador. For legislative elections,
all the countries except Chile use some variant of proportional representation (PR),
with average district magnitudes ranging from 4.4 in Paraguay to 19 in Brazil. Chile
adopted a form of majority (“binomial”) system that favors the two largest parties
competing for the two seats up for election in each district. These differences in
electoral rules affect the representativeness and effectiveness of the political system,
two aspects expected to influence diffuse and specific support.
As summarized in Table 2, PR systems with large district magnitudes like those
in Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay promote the most equitable representation of diverse
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Table 2: Legislative Electoral Systems, Disproportionality, Number of Parties
and Policy-Making Effectiveness in South American Democracies
Country Electoral rules Disproportionality Effective number Policy-Making
Lower House (Gallagher Index)a of partiesb Effectiveness
Argentina PR, medium-sized 7.58 3.80 Low
districts
Bolivia Mixed-member PR 4.65 5.14 Low
large districts
Brazil PR, large districts 3.56 7.70 Minimal
Chile Majority (“Binomial”), 6.72 2.43 High
small districts
Colombia PR, medium-sized 5.24 3.34 Low
districts
Ecuador PR, small districts 8.50 7.21 Low
Paraguay PR, medium-sized 6.80 2.69 Low
districts
Peru PR, large districts 9.14 4.61 Low
Uruguay PR, large districts 0.94 3.19 Low
Venezuela Mixed-member PR 7.89 4.42 Low
medium-sized districts
Source: Author’s compilation, based on Payne, Zovato, and Mateo (2007).
Notes: aIn lower house elections. Higher values indicate more disproportional systems.
bBased on votes in lower house elections.
interests in the political decision-making process. At the same time, they run the risk
of fostering legislative atomization and rendering governing more difficult, especially
when – as in Brazil – the number of parties with a realistic chance of obtaining seats is
large. On the other hand, Chile’s binomial system, which promotes a concentration of
legislative seats, boosts policy-making effectiveness at the expense of proportionality.
Besides these politico-institutional differences, South American nations vary in
their economic and socio-demographic characteristics. As shown in Table A.1 of
the Online Appendix, the more robust or relatively successful democracies (Chile,
Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil) are also the more economically developed. Towards
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the end of our sample period, GDP per capita in Chile was more than 5 times higher
than in Bolivia, while the proportion of people living in poverty was 5 times lower.
Variations in illiteracy and infant mortality were also substantial, indicating notice-
able differences in states’ investments in social welfare. For instance, infant mortality
rates ranged from 7 and 8.7 per 1,000 births in Chile and Uruguay, respectively, to
more than 30 in Bolivia. Nevertheless, the relationship between democratic qual-
ity and socio-economic indicators is not linear. Income distribution in Chile was
more unequal than in crisis-ridden polities like Bolivia and Peru, whereas Venezuela’s
eroding democracy exhibited one of the lowest Gini coefficients in the region (0.40).
The incidence of poverty was also higher in Argentina than in Ecuador or Paraguay,
while Colombia and Peru had lower infant mortality and illiteracy rates than Brazil.
Although the political deterioration in Venezuela has taken its toll on economic per-
formance, Peru grew at an annual rate of 3.3% over the sample period, faster than
any of the more robust democracies. That said, growth was erratic in most countries,
with recurrent accelerations and reversals (see Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix).
In sum, the countries under study differ markedly in their political, institutional
and socio-economic features, more so than the widely researched industrialized nations
(Booth and Seligson, 2009). The question of political support in South America,
however, has received comparatively little academic attention (Bargsted, Somma,
and Castillo, 2017), and thus our analysis allows exploring the relative weight and
evolution of the different support types and their relationship to the explanatory
factors underscored by prior research in a relatively new setting. In particular, South
America provides an ideal scenario for testing performance-based accounts of political
support. Hagopian (2005) maintains that poor government performance is the key
source of political discontent in the region, and the reason why citizens are willing
to back populist leaders with questionable faith in democratic mechanisms as long
as they deliver – or promise to deliver – solutions to salient national problems. It
is precisely under these conditions when one would expect the link between system
performance and perceived regime legitimacy to be more pronounced (Norris, 1999).
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While satisfaction with the workings of democracy has declined in several indus-
trialized nations as well (e.g., Holmberg, 1999), democracy as a form of government is
overwhelmingly accepted in these more prosperous and stable polities, and thus the
decline in support has been constrained to the “positive end” of the legitimacy scale
(Booth and Seligson, 2009: 102). As we noted in Section 2, mean regime support is
substantially lower in South America, and the gap between public expectations and
system performance wider (Hagopian, 2005). In fact, perceived regime legitimacy
is also lower on average in South America than in new Asian, African or Eastern
European democracies (Doorenspleet, 2012; Fuchs and Roller, 2006; Rose, Shin, and
Munro, 1999; Segovia, 2008). Hence, the consequences of mass political disaffection
are potentially more pernicious for democratic stability. On the other hand, if diffuse
support is relatively insensitive to performance deficiencies in this scenario, the desta-
bilizing influence of government failures or disappointing policy outcomes should be
even weaker in more solid (established and young) democracies.
Although some of the patterns discussed in this section may hold for Latin Amer-
ica in general, focusing on South America facilitates a more detailed consideration of
their impact on support while avoiding gross extrapolations of localized trends to a
diverse continent (Booth and Seligson, 2009). Concentrating on a moderate number
of geographically contiguous states sharing similar historical and cultural origins also
mitigates concerns about unobserved confounding and about the cross-national va-
lidity of the survey questions used in the analysis – which become more problematic
as sample countries grow in size and diversity (Hallquist and Wright, 2014).
4 Data and Methods
Our empirical analysis uses data from the yearly surveys conducted in South America
by the Latinobarometer public opinion project between 1996 and 2015.4 This is the
longest public opinion time-series data available for South America, allowing us to
track the evolution of political support for almost two decades. We analyzed items
4The first survey, conducted in 1995, did not cover Bolivia, Ecuador, or Colombia.
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included in all the surveys, yielding a sample size of 147,252.5 The individual data
was matched to macro-level economic, political, and institutional indicators.
Our dependent variables are built from eight questions tapping into participants’
trust in political actors and institutions, along with general attitudes toward democ-
racy. The first six questions asked respondents their degree of confidence in Govern-
ment, the President, the National Congress, the Political Parties, the Judiciary, and
the Military.6 These items gauge trust in representative and implementation bod-
ies (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008), and can be taken as indicators of support for both
“(...) the specific political actors in charge of every institution and the overarching
principles of democracy” (Zmerli, Newton, and Montero, 2007: 41).
The last two items assessed attitudes towards democratic performance and prin-
ciples. One is the standard “satisfaction with democracy” (SWD) question asking
respondents their level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in their coun-
try. Although this item has been widely used as a measure of diffuse support in the
political science literature (e.g., Weitz-Shapiro, 2008), scholars have shown that it
can also correlate with support for incumbents or government performance (Linde
and Ekman, 2003). The other item asked participants whether they always preferred
democracy to any other form of government; responses to this question provide a
more unequivocal measure of general support for democracy (Weitz-Shapiro, 2008).
The independent variables comprise individual and contextual factors expected to
influence the probability that respondents are classified into the four support types
described in Section 2. Following the discussion in 2.1, the individual-level covari-
ates include: subjective measures of economic satisfaction (evaluations of the national
economy and personal finances, employment status and concerns); respondents’ polit-
ical orientations (self-placement on the left-right scale and spatial distance from the in-
cumbent party); inter-personal trust; education; and other socio-demographic controls
5Additionally, a random sample of 49,084 observations was used for out-of-sample evaluation of
our model’s predictive accuracy.
6Other items measuring trust in the state, local government, the public administration and
election authorities were available for specific years, but not for the entire sample period. We used
these items to assess the content-validity of our estimates (Online Appendix, Tables A.6 and A.7).
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(age, gender, and income). The contextual (country-year) variables are: the combined
Freedom House score for political rights and civil liberties; the (dis)proportionality
of the electoral system, as captured by the Gallagher Index (Gallagher, 1991); the
degree of institutionalization and longevity of the party system; the effective number
of parties; macro-economic indicators (GDP growth, GDP per capita, unemployment,
inflation, poverty rate, and Gini coefficient); and an indicator of welfare policy (total
government spending on health, education and social protection, as a percentage of
GDP).7 The coding and sources for all the variables are given in the Online Appendix.
4.1 Empirical Approach
To classify individuals into support types, we simultaneously examined the eight sur-
vey questions gauging confidence in institutions and attitudes towards democracy.
This accounts for the fact that political support is a multidimensional and latent con-
struct that cannot be accurately captured by any single indicator (Gershtenson and
Plane, 2012). However, rather than following the standard practice of collapsing all
items into a composite index – which would lump together and jumble the diffuse and
specific components (Ulbig, 2002) – we used a supervised machine learning algorithm
to sort individuals into types based on their joint responses to the eight questions
while estimating the association between each item and support dimension.
Machine learning techniques have become popular in the social sciences in re-
cent years, as they facilitate measurement, classification, and prediction in an era of
increasingly larger datasets and more abundant computational resources (Grimmer,
2015). One common unsupervised machine learning tool used for classification is
cluster analysis, which sorts cases into groups based on their similarity across a set
of predictive features. However, while unsupervised methods may uncover interesting
patterns in the data, they are entirely exploratory and can produce classifications
7Freedom House scores were reversed, giving higher values to countries with better political rights
and civil liberties ratings; using Polity IV scores as an alternative did not change the the results. We
also fitted models including government spending on health, education or social protection separately
as indicators of welfare policy, with little effect on the results.
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that lack substantive relevance. To ensure that our cases (survey respondents) were
classified into theoretically relevant classes, we instead applied a supervised machine
learning procedure. This approach consists of two steps: (1) a training stage, where
we specify what patterns to look for in a subset of the data in which predictive fea-
tures (answers to the survey items) and outcomes (support types) are fully observed
for all units; and (2) a test stage, where the algorithm is used to classify cases in the
entire Latinobarometer dataset.
To generate the training sample required for the first stage, we selected a subset
of our data consisting of 100 randomly drawn observations from each country-year.
In order to learn about the underlying type of each individual in this sub-sample, we
estimated a latent class model explaining the responses to the survey items as a func-
tion of two discrete latent variables representing the diffuse and specific dimensions
of political support. The linear predictor mij capturing the relationship between the
latent variables and individual i’s response to survey item j is given by:
mij = ldj(cdi − 1) + lsj(csi − 1) (1)
where cdi and csi are categorical variables taking values 1 (low) or 2 (high), denoting
i’s score on the diffuse and specific support dimensions, respectively; and the factor
loadings ldj and lsj measure the strength of the relationship between i’s scores on
each dimension and her response to survey item j. Equation (1) allows – but does
not force – responses to all items to be influenced by individuals’ levels of both diffuse
and specific support. We estimated ldj and lsj and recovered the values of cdi and csi
through Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations (Jackman, 2000), assigning
each respondent to one of the four support types based on the sampled values of cdi and
csi. More precisely, individual i was classified as a “satisfied democrat” if {cdi, csi} =
{high, high}; as a “dissatisfied democrat” when {cdi, csi} = {high, low}; as “anti-
system” if {cdi, csi} = {low, high}; and as “alienated” if {cdi, csi} = {low, low}.8
8Alvarez, Levin, and Nun˜ez (2017) employ a similar latent class model to develop a typology
of political participants. They apply their model to survey data from Argentina and use it to
classify respondents into four participatory types based on reported engagement in conventional and
unconventional political activities.
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While MCMC estimation of the latent class model is feasible in the restricted train-
ing sample, Bayesian inference becomes computationally impractical for the complete
dataset containing almost 150,000 observations. Hence, for the test stage, we used
a supervised machine learning algorithm to learn from the relationship between sup-
port types and survey responses in the training sample, and then applied it to classify
the respondents in the cumulative Latinobarometer data (for whom only the answers
to the survey questions – but not their types – are observed). We used a k-Nearest
Neighbors (k-NN) algorithm to classify each respondent by “majority voting,” iden-
tifying the most common type among her k-nearest hypothetical neighbors in the
training sample (Hastie et al., 2009).
After this test stage, we fitted a multinomial logit model in order to examine
the influence of individual and contextual variables on the probability of type as-
signment, simultaneously including all the micro- and macro-level determinants of
political support as regressors and clustering the standard errors to accommodate ar-
bitrary correlation in survey responses at the country-year level.9 To account for the
fact that support types are estimated (rather than observed), the whole procedure
(training, supervised classification and multinomial logit estimation) was repeated
100 times. Hence, the parameter estimates reported in the next section take classi-
fication uncertainty into consideration, as they were calculated by combining results
across all the iterations of the learning process.10
Before discussing our results, it is important to mention two key issues related to
our empirical approach. First, our strategy of combining Bayesian latent class anal-
ysis and supervised machine learning tools constitutes an important methodological
contribution that improves on standard practice. When using a supervised machine
learning approach, careful specification of the relationship between predictive features
and outcomes in the training dataset is crucial, as it guides the learning process. By
9In principle, the estimation of the regression coefficients could be conducted as part of the
classification process. This, however, can alter the substantive interpretation of the support types
(e.g., Asparouhov and Muthe´n, 2014).
10We verified that additional (e.g., 1,000) replications yield virtually identical results.
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“informing” the classification algorithm with the first-stage latent class estimates, our
approach allows us to construct a training dataset without resorting to commonly im-
posed but arbitrary restrictions on the mapping between survey items and support
dimensions – e.g., assuming a priori that certain items tap into either diffuse or spe-
cific aspects only (Easton, 1975; Gershtenson and Plane, 2012). Our method ensures
that respondents are classified into substantively meaningful categories without the
need for such ex-ante and ad-hoc constraints, while also incorporating classification
uncertainty into subsequent stages of the analysis.
Second, the number of categories of the discrete latent variables cdi and csi in
our model are dictated by our analytical framework, which – as discussed in Section
2 – distinguishes between four types of citizens depending on whether their levels
of diffuse and specific support are high or low. This is a usual practice in latent
class analysis when there are clear theoretical expectations regarding the nature of
the groups underlying the data (Finch and Bronk, 2011). In such cases, defining the
number of classes “(...) is not a statistical issue but a theoretical one that should be
based on the substantive interest of the researcher” (Oberski, 2016: 180). Nonethe-
less, we also estimated a factor-analytic version of our model, treating diffuse and
specific support as continuous latent variables without imposing any restrictions on
the number of support types present in the data or on their characteristics. As we
show in the Online Appendix (Figures A.2-A.5), the results reported below remain
similar under this alternative measurement approach, providing empirical validation
for our theoretically-derived groupings. Furthermore, we replicated our analysis using
out-of-sample observations (footnote 5) to check for over-fitting, obtaining a virtu-
ally identical partition of survey respondent into support types as in our full dataset.
Finally, we estimated several alternative models with different number of classes,
attempting to balance parsimony and accuracy (Hallquist and Wright, 2014). As re-
ported in Table A.2 of the Online Appendix, our preferred model outperforms these
alternative specifications according to a variety of model selection criteria. Together,
these robustness checks indicate that our findings are not simply an artifact of our
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empirical specification and reinforce our confidence in the validity of our conclusions.
5 Results
We start by examining the substantive relationship between the two dimensions of
political support and the survey items used as dependent variables in our analysis. To
this end, Figure 1 presents the estimated factor loadings corresponding to the latent
class model (i.e. parameters ldj and lsj in equation 1).
Figure 1: Relationship Between Survey Items and Dimensions of Support
Note: The figure plots point estimates (circles) and 90% credible intervals (horizontal lines) for the
loading parameters (ldj , lsj) of the latent class model. These parameters regulate the relationship
between each survey item and the diffuse and specific scores (cdi, csi).
The items associated with confidence in political actors and institutions load on
both the diffuse and specific scores (cdi and csi). On the other hand, the items gauging
satisfaction with and preference for democracy load much more heavily on the diffuse
component. This highlights a difference between the two support dimensions that is
consistent with Easton (1965)’s argument that diffuse support is intrinsically related
to dispositions towards democratic principles and values, while specific support is
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primarily associated with evaluations of particular political actors and institutions.
To further assess whether discriminating the two support dimensions enhances
the explanatory power of our analysis, we estimated an alternative specification col-
lapsing the diffuse and specific components into a single dimension. Table A.3 in the
Online Appendix compares the fit of both models based on several statistics com-
monly used in the mixture modeling literature (Hallquist and Wright, 2014). The
results of this exercise demonstrate that our preferred specification fares better than
the simpler, uni-dimensional model, indicating that accommodating the two support
dimensions proposed by Easton (1965) yields a markedly improved fit and provides a
better account of respondents’ political attitudes than simply ignoring the distinction
between diffuse and specific support ex-ante. At the same time, Figure 1 reveals that
assuming a priori that certain items tap exclusively into one or the other dimension
is problematic, as is the practice of collapsing all the indicators into a composite scale
that ignores variations in the strength of the relationship between each indicator and
support dimension.
Table 3 summarizes the responses to the different survey items among the four
theoretical support types distinguished in Section 2, as well as the relative weight
of each type in the Latinobarometer dataset.11 Respondents classified as satisfied
democrats (alienated) display the highest (lowest) levels of confidence in political
actors and institutions. For satisfied democrats, mean confidence levels in national
government, Congress, the judiciary, political parties, the president and the military
lie all significantly above the sample averages, while the opposite is true for alienated
types. Individuals in the former group also tend to be fairly satisfied with democracy
(their average score on the SWD question is 2.81 on a 4-point scale), and a vast
majority of them (73%) prefer democracy over autocracy under any circumstance.
Conversely, alienated citizens are less satisfied with they way democracy works than
the average survey respondent, and only 55% of them believe that democracy is always
the best form of government.
Dissatisfied democrats are also strongly supportive of fundamental and functional
11Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Online Appendix detail the distribution of responses by support type.
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Table 3: Response Patterns across Support Types
and Proportion of each Type in the Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Item Satisfied Dissatisfied Anti-system Alienated All
democrats democrats
Trust in Government 3.21 2.86 1.71 1.28 2.20
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trust in Congress 3.10 1.96 2.01 1.10 2.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
Trust in Justice 3.06 2.20 1.93 1.19 2.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trust in Parties 2.64 1.68 1.76 1.12 1.78
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trust in President 3.37 3.04 1.92 1.44 2.3
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trust in Military 3.07 2.40 2.53 1.78 2.43
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Satisfaction with democracy 2.81 2.48 2.01 1.80 2.25
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Preference for democracy 0.73 0.72 0.54 0.55 0.63
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Proportion in the sample (%) 23.07 22.53 28.86 25.53
Note: Columns (1)-(4) display average values of responses to each item among respondents assigned
to different support types. Column (5) presents averages for all survey respondents. The p-values
of (two-sided, paired-samples) tests for differences in item scores between each type and the whole
sample are reported in parenthesis. The bottom row reports the share of each type in the sample.
aspects of democracy. Those assigned to this category are significantly more likely to
be content with the workings of democracy than the average Latinobarometer respon-
dent, and 72% of them prefer democracy over autocracy. While these individuals also
exhibit above-average levels of trust in government, the president and the justice sys-
tem, their confidence in parliament, political parties and the military is significantly
lower than the sample average.
Lastly, anti-system types are less satisfied with the functioning of democracy than
the average survey respondent, and exhibit the lowest level of support for democratic
government: 46% of them prefer an autocracy or are indifferent between both regimes.
These respondents also display below-average levels of trust in most political actors
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and institutions, but express relatively high confidence in the military (2.5 on a 4-
point scale, significantly higher than the sample mean). It is not surprising for citizens
with little attachment to democratic ideals to be quite supportive of the military in
view of the role played by the armed forces during the dictatorships of the 1970s and
1980s and their involvement in the political life of these countries even long after the
transition (Koonigs and Kruijt, 2003). Moreover, several of the “anti-system political
leaders” (Hagopian, 2005: 320) that gained popularity in the region during the last
decades – e.g., Gutie´rrez in Ecuador, Humala in Peru, Cha´vez in Venezuela – were
former military officers.
The bottom row of Table 3 reports the proportion of each support type in the
sample. Roughly 25.5% of the respondents across all countries and years were classi-
fied as alienated, almost 29% as anti-system, 23% as satisfied democrats, and 22.5%
as dissatisfied democrats. In other words, more than half of South Americans exhibit
low levels of diffuse support, whereas less than a quarter of them display high scores
on both the diffuse and specific dimensions. These findings are consistent with prior
evidence indicating that average levels of diffuse support in South America are quite
low – even among developing democracies (Hagopian, 2005).
The distribution of support types, however, varies considerably across countries.
This is illustrated in Figure 2, which depicts the average size of each group for
every South American country over the sample period. The proportion of satis-
fied democrats is highest in Uruguay (42%), and lowest in Paraguay (18%), Bolivia
(16.5%), Ecuador (16%), and Peru (11%), the four “crisis-ridden polities” (Mainwar-
ing and Hagopian, 2005). The fraction of dissatisfied democrats, i.e., the other group
of respondents with high diffuse support, is largest in Chile (31%). The predomi-
nance of the two types of citizens with strong regime attachments in the two most
robust democracies of the region is aligned with the theoretical arguments outlined in
Section 2.1. At the other extreme, and also in agreement with our expectations, alien-
ated types with low levels of diffuse and specific support are more plentiful in fragile
democracies (Peru, 36%; Ecuador, 33%; and Paraguay, 31%), and less abundant in
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the more solid regimes (Uruguay, 14%; Chile, 16%).
Figure 2: Proportion of Respondents Assigned to Each Type, by Country
Note: Bars indicate the share of respondents allocated to the different types in each country, on
average over the sample period. Vertical lines give the percentage of individuals assigned to each
type across all countries and years.
Interestingly, while anti-system types are also relatively common in crisis-ridden
(Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador) or deteriorating (Colombia) democracies, it is in
Brazil where this group is more prevalent (35% of survey participants). As we men-
tioned above, Mainwaring and Hagopian (2005) consider Brazil a surprising example
of successful democratization in light of its deeply authoritarian political heritage.
Figure 2 suggests that the nation’s democratic success has not been accompanied
by mass adherence to fundamental regime principles. This is in line with Weyland
(2005), who contends that acceptance of democracy as the “only game in town” has
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increased among Brazilian elites but remains weak at the popular level.
By contrast Venezuela, where we anticipated a large fraction of anti-system types
based on the arguments in Sections 2 and 3, has the lowest share of individuals in
this category. Because most of our sample period overlaps Chavez’s government,
and given the erosion of democratic practices during his administration (Coppedge,
2005), we expected respondents expressing support for institutions dominated by
Chavez loyalists to be ambivalent – to say the least – about democracy. However,
the majority of Venezuelans who exhibit high levels of specific support also display
high diffuse support. This can be seen by comparing the top- and bottom-left panels
of Figure 2: the proportion of anti-system types (21%) is considerably lower than
that of satisfied democrats (34%). While individuals in the latter group remain
ultimately committed to democratic ideals, they seem willing to (temporarily) forgive
democratic transgressions in exchange for – what they believe to be – competent or
well functioning institutions.12 This interpretation is in accordance with Canache
(2002)’s conclusions regarding the electoral support base of Chavismo.
The disparities in the relative predominance of types translate into varying levels
of diffuse and specific support across polities. Figure 3 summarizes these differences,
displaying the proportion of respondents classified as having high levels of diffuse
(horizontal axis) and specific (vertical axis) support in each country between 1996 and
2015. The figure reveals that the two dimensions are positively correlated: countries
with high (low) aggregate levels of diffuse support tend to exhibit high (low) overall
scores on the specific dimension. Uruguay and Chile show above-average levels of
both forms of support. The same holds true, unexpectedly but consistently with
Figure 2, for Venezuela.13 On the other hand, the crisis-ridden democracies (Bolivia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Paraguay) score poorly on the two dimensions. These estimates
12Alternatively, individuals in this group might actually perceive Chavismo as democratic, perhaps
even as an expression of a more radical or profound kind of democracy (e.g., Ellner, 2001). However,
this view is difficult to square with Batista, Seligson, and Zechmeister (2013)’s finding that the vast
majority of committed democrats in Venezuela favor checks and balances.
13This result is also consistent with previous findings based on different methods and data sources
(e.g., Batista, Seligson, and Zechmeister, 2013).
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Figure 3: Relationship between Diffuse and Specific Support
Note: Circles indicate the share of respondents with high levels of diffuse and specific support
between 1996 and 2015. Dashed lines give cross-country averages throughout the sample period.
lend credence to our argument that the diffuse and specific components may be more
tightly linked than has been typically assumed; Figure A.6 in the Online Appendix
shows that this close connection is also verified for most countries over time.
Figures 2 and 3 highlight relevant differences in the varieties and dimensions of
support across South American nations. The impact of institutional, performance-
related and socio-demographic factors on these differences is examined in Figures
4 and 5. As seen in Figure 4, four institutional characteristics exert a systematic
influence on the relative prevalence of the different support types: the extent to
which civil rights and political liberties are safeguarded in practice, the degree of
institutionalization of the party system, the effective number of parties (ENP), and
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the disproportionality of the electoral system.
Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Contextual Factors on Type Assignment
Note: Circles represent the expected change in the probability of assignment to each type
associated with a change in the covariates. Horizontal lines give 90% confidence intervals.
Keeping everything else fixed, each point increase in Freedom House’s (inverted)
combined score for political rights and civil liberties is associated with a 2.4 per-
centage point increase in the probability that the typical respondent is classified as
a dissatisfied democrat, and a 2.6 point decrease in her probability of belonging to
the alienated class. This variable has no significant impact on the proportion of ei-
ther satisfied democrats or anti-system types. Hence, a more effective protection of
civil and political rights – taken as a proxy for the level of democratization or demo-
cratic quality of a polity (Booth and Seligson, 2009; Norris, 1999) – affects regime’s
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perceived legitimacy among South Americans disenchanted with political actors and
institutions. When the overall quality of democracy is (comparatively) high, even
individuals who distrust political actors and state institutions adhere to elementary
democratic tenets. In contrast, at lower levels of democratization, mistrust of political
decision-makers is more easily conjoined with low diffuse support.
A similar conclusion holds regarding the institutionalization of the party system:
a higher degree of institutionalization is associated with a lower share of alienated
types and a higher fraction of dissatisfied democrats. This is in consonance with
Levitsky and Cameron (2003)’s thesis that more institutionalized party systems pro-
vide citizens with opportunities to channel their dissatisfaction with incumbents and
government bodies through or within the political establishment. Instead, when par-
ties are weakly linked to the citizenry and unable to represent its interests or voice
its demands, politically dissatisfied citizens tend to “withdraw” from politics. The
degree of institutionalization of the party system has also a negative impact on the
percentage of anti-system types on average, although – contrary to our expectations
– this marginal effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Each additional “viable” party, in turn, is accompanied by a one percentage point
increase in the fraction anti-system types and a 3.1 point increase in the share of
alienated respondents. Concomitantly, the proportions of satisfied and dissatisfied
democrats decline by 3.1 and 1.0 points, respectively. Altogether, the proportion of
respondents classified as having high diffuse support drops by 9.1 percentage points
for every additional viable party in the system, while the fraction of participants with
high levels of specific support diminishes by 8.6 points. These findings conform to
the notion that effective policy-making becomes more challenging as the number of
parties with a realistic chance of obtaining political representation grows (e.g., Weil,
1989). In South America, this not only undercuts support for the politicians and
institutions in charge of implementing policy, but also for democratic government.
As for the disproportionality of the electoral system, we expected – drawing on
Freitag and Bu¨hlmann (2009) and Norris (1999) – a more equitable representation
27
of political interests in the decision-making process to be positively correlated with
diffuse and specific support. This expectation is not borne out by the data. Each
standard deviation increase in the Gallagher Index is correlated with a 0.5 percentage
point reduction in the fraction of anti-system types, which is matched by a rise in the
proportion of satisfied democrats. That is, electoral disproportionality induces a near
perfect trade-off between the two types with high specific support; the overall levels of
diffuse and specific support remain essentially unchanged. This result, together with
the estimated effects for ENP, suggests that South Americans tend to have an instru-
mental view of representative democracy: while the combination of fewer parties and
more disproportional electoral rules limits representativeness, it may enhance gov-
ernment effectiveness and potentially improve policy outcomes – which, our analysis
indicates, play a key role in public assessments of democracy in the region.14
Related to this point, Figure 4 shows that welfare policies have a considerable
impact on the varieties of political support: the share of alienated respondents drops
by 0.9 percentage points with each percentage increase in governments’ social expen-
diture (on health, education and social protection). Objective measures of economic
performance, on the other hand, do not significantly affect the distribution of sup-
port types. Nevertheless, macro-economic outcomes have an indirect influence on
political support through their impact on citizens’ subjective economic evaluations,
as illustrated in Figure 5.
Respondents who thought that their country’s economy or their own financial cir-
cumstances had improved a little over the previous year were significantly more likely
to be classified as satisfied or dissatisfied democrats than those who thought that
the economic situation of their nation or of their household had worsened during the
same period. Socio-tropic (i.e. other-regarding) and pocketbook (i.e. self-regarding)
optimism also reduced the probability of assignment to the anti-system or alienated
14We also fitted specifications including an interaction between ENP and the Gallagher Index. As
discussed in Section 3, the combination of strongly proportional systems and a large number of parties
may render policy-making especially difficult. While – consistent with Figure 4 – disproportionality
tends to mitigate the negative impact of ENP on support, the interaction is not significant.
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Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Individual Variables on Type Assignment
Note: Circles represent the expected change in the probability of assignment to each type
associated with a change in the covariates. Horizontal lines give 90% confidence intervals.
categories. Similarly, participants who were worried about losing their job were 3.2
percentage points less likely to fall in the category of satisfied democrats than those
not at all concerned about job security, and one point less likely to be classified as
dissatisfied democrats. At the same time, concerns about job security increased the
probability of holding anti-system views or becoming alienated by 1.4 and 2.8 points,
respectively. The joint impact of economic judgments is quite sizable, and – in line
with the findings in Katz and Levin (2016) – influences not only public assessments of
political decision-makers but, more importantly, opinions about democracy. Holding
all other variables at their mean sample values, a respondent who believed that na-
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tional and personal economic conditions had improved over the previous 12 months
and who thought her job was secure was 44.6 percentage points more likely to have a
high level of specific support, and a whopping 59.7 points more likely to exhibit high
diffuse support, than someone with negative economic perceptions.
Individuals’ political beliefs are also relevant predictors of type assignment. Each
increase in the average respondent’s ideological distance to the ruling party reduces
the likelihood that she is classified as a convinced – either satisfied or dissatisfied –
democrat while simultaneously raising her probability of holding anti-system views or
becoming alienated from politics. Thus, whereas research in advanced democracies
has shown that being politically close to the incumbent government renders citizens
more supportive of the administration and of representative institutions (Listhaug,
1995), ideological distance between mass and elites seems to have more fundamental
implications in South America, as it can undermine faith in core democratic principles.
Additionally, moving to the left of the ideological spectrum reduces the probability of
being assigned to the group of satisfied democrats by 2.2 percentage points, raising
the likelihood of being classified as alienated by 3.8 points. Our results are partially
consistent with Seligson (2007)’s conclusion that Latin American leftists express little
support for democracy: 56% of them show indeed low levels of diffuse support in our
sample. On the other hand, the estimates in Figure 5 indicate that, keeping all other
variables constant, a left-winger with low regime support is 2.2 percentage points
less likely to embrace anti-system values than someone with equally low regard for
democratic forms of government but placed to the right of the ideological scale.
Inter-personal trust is another significant individual-level driver of political sup-
port. Respondents who believed that “one can trust most people” were 9.6 percentage
points more likely to be classified as satisfied democrats than those who manifested
that “one can never be too careful when dealing with others.” Higher inter-personal
trust was also significantly correlated with decreases in the probability of being tagged
as anti-system (-2.7 percentage points) and alienated (-6.7 points).
The relationship between education and political support in South America is re-
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vealing. Previous studies have found that, in well-established regimes, more educated
individuals tend to be more supportive of democratic government but also more criti-
cal of its functioning in practice (e.g., Dalton, 2005; Magalha˜es, 2013). Our estimates,
however, uncover no systematic differences in the degree of either diffuse or specific
support between more educated respondents – those with a university degree – and
participants with average – secondary – education levels. In this respect, the results
for our sample countries resembles those for other recently democratized – e.g., Asian
(Rose, Shin, and Munro, 1999) – nations. As Rose, Shin, and Munro (1999) note,
this is to some extent a reassuring finding, as it suggests that regime support in these
(comparatively) novel democracies is not confined to the academic or intellectual elite.
That said, education does have some influence on South Americans with low diffuse
support: conditional on having little faith in democracy, individuals with a college
degree are 0.3 percentage points more likely to be classified as anti-system than those
with secondary education. In other words, when disappointed with democratic prac-
tices and procedures, highly educated respondents are somewhat more prone to turn
to anti-establishment political options than the rest.
The role of economic perceptions and social policy indicators in determining cit-
izens’ type assignment suggests that the relative weight of the different varieties of
political support might have fluctuated over the sample period. As discussed in
Section 2.1, institutional and socio-demographic characteristics may contribute to
explain cross-national differences in support (as corroborated in Figures 4 and 5),
but these factors tend to be rather stable. Performance-related measures, on the
other hand, can be quite volatile, and thus more likely to account for the dynamics
of support types. Figure 6, which tracks the evolution of each type’s share in the An-
dean (Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela) and Southern Cone (Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay) countries, shows that there were indeed some
noticeable shifts in the distribution of support types over time.
The share of alienated types increased by 37 percentage points in the Southern
Cone and by 68 points in the Andean countries between 2000 and 2003, as the ef-
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Figure 6: Regional Dynamics of Political Support
Note: Solid (dashed) lines represent average shares of each support type in Andean (Southern Cone)
countries between 1996 and 2015; shaded areas give 90% confidence intervals.
fect of the international (Asian and Russian) financial crises of the late 1990s rippled
across South America. As seen in Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix, these years
brought about a pronounced downturn in all South American nations. Moreover, as
demonstrated by Gautam (2015), these crises were accompanied by substantial re-
ductions in aggregate social expenditure throughout the region, as governments faced
stringent budget restrictions. The impact of the recession was short-lived, though:
the proportion of alienated respondents in the Andes and the Southern Cone dropped
drastically the following year – when the whole region began a period of recovery -
and returned to its pre-crisis levels already in 2005. Although the relative size of this
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group rose again after 2009, following the global financial meltdown, this shift was
much more moderate, as the economic repercussions of this event were comparatively
mild for South America (Figure A.1). The curve representing the share of satisfied
democrats is almost the mirror image of its counterpart for alienated respondents. In
contrast, the fraction of dissatisfied democrats and anti-system respondents remained
more stable throughout the period. Figures A.8 and A.9 in the Online Appendix
show that country-level dynamics were generally consistent with these (sub-)regional
patterns.
The evidence in Figure 6 thus confirms that performance variables – economic
outcomes, through their influence on citizens’ retrospective evaluations, and social
policy outputs – were key determinants of the evolution of diffuse and specific support
over the sample period. The share of respondents with high diffuse (specific) support
dropped by 10.4 (15.0) percentage points between 2000 and 2003, but recovered in full
less than two years later. The two dimensions responded in tandem to the economic
developments of the early 2000s, further substantiating our claim that adherence
to democratic principles and norms in the region is closely linked to evaluations of
political actors and of the outputs produced by the political system.
6 Conclusion
Drawing on Easton (1965)’s theoretical framework, this paper develops an analytical
typology to characterize differences in citizens’ levels of diffuse and specific support,
applying a novel empirical strategy that combines Bayesian inference, machine learn-
ing methods and regression models to assess the impact of individual and contextual
variables on the prevalence and evolution of different support types. Our approach
allows studying the dynamic relationship between the two support dimensions and
the interplay between their determinants, filling a relevant gap in the literature.
Our study of South American survey data covering the last two decades reveals
that more than half of the respondents exhibit little attachment to fundamental and
functional aspects of democracy, while less than a quarter score high on both the
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diffuse and specific dimension of political support. The prevalence of different citizen
types varies across countries and over time, reflecting institutional, performance and
socio-demographic factors. The dynamics of the two support dimensions are closely
linked, and are especially sensitive to changes in economic conditions influencing indi-
viduals’ retrospective judgments and social policy outputs. Contrary to prior research
on industrialized nations, our estimates indicate that negative economic shocks not
only undermine support for particular government actors but, more worryingly, also
fuel disenchantment with democracy. On a positive note, both support dimensions
bounce back rather quickly in periods of economic recovery.
Although our analysis has clear regional and temporal specificity, South Ameri-
can polities share common features with other young democracies not only in Latin
America, but also in Africa, Asia and Central-Eastern Europe. In many of these
countries, the process of democratic consolidation proved challenging, legal and po-
litical institutions remain under-developed, and the quality of democratic governance
is still precarious (Hagopian, 2005; Rose, Shin, and Munro, 1999). Moreover, as in
South America, democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and some African nations
occurred in tandem with market-oriented reforms that produced widespread economic
dislocations and heightened political stress for the new regimes (Mishler and Rose,
1999; Webster and Adler, 1999). As a result, like South America’s anti-system and
alienated types, a sizable fraction of the citizenry in several post-transitional societies
is highly skeptical about democracy. For instance, more than a third of the citizens
in the former communist bloc were nostalgic of the old regime a decade after the fall
of the Iron Curtain, and a hefty proportion of them continue to express reservations
about the new regime (Fuchs and Roller, 2006; Segovia, 2008). Likewise, Dooren-
spleet (2012) shows that almost a quarter of Afrobarometer respondents expresses
little attachment to democratic forms of government. Under these circumstances, the
risk persists that, faced with economic crises or external shocks, some of these nations
may revert to their authoritarian legacy (Norris, 1999: 2).
Our findings are somewhat encouraging in this respect, as they suggest that even
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when diffuse support may be quite volatile in emerging democracies, it can be ulti-
mately resistant to fluctuations in system performance. And, as discussed in Section
3, there is reason to believe that diffuse support should be even more resilient in
other embryonic democracies where perceived regime legitimacy is higher than in
South America. Although generalizing lessons from context-specific studies is always
difficult, our theoretical framework and empirical strategy could be easily applied to
different periods and polities outside South America, allowing to assess the robust-
ness of our conclusions in alternative settings. The growing availability of long public
opinion time-series data for other new democracies renders this a natural extension
of our study. Such extension would also enable testing the impact of other factors
– e.g., the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems – that exhibit
little or no variation in our sample but may be nonetheless important for explaining
the level and/or dynamics of diffuse and specific support from a broader comparative
perspective. More generally, contrasting trends among a larger set of nations and dis-
tinguishing common structural patterns from region-specific trajectories would help
better understand the mechanisms governing the motion of the two dimensions and
their interactions, complementing and expanding the literature in this area. We leave
a thorough examination of these issues for future work.
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Online Appendix
This Appendix accompanying the paper “Varieties of Political Support in Emerg-
ing Democracies: A Cross-National Analysis” includes information about data sources
and coding and additional estimation results. Specifically, Section A presents ad-
ditional socio-economic and performance indicators for South American countries,
supplementing the discussion in Section 3 of the paper. Section B presents the defini-
tion, coding and sources for the dependent and independent variables included in our
empirical analysis. Sections C includes several figures (C.1) and tables (C.2) report-
ing additional estimation results that supplement the information presented in the
empirical section (Section 5) of the text. Finally, Section D lists additional sources
consulted for the elaboration of this Appendix.
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A. Additional socio-economic and performance in-
dicators for South American countries
Table A.1: Socio-economic characteristics of South American countries, 2015
Country GDP per Growth, GDP Poverty Inequality Illiteracy Infant
per capitaa per capita (%)b (%)c (Gini) (%)d Mortalitye
Argentina 10,571 1.8 28.7 0.40 1.9 11.1
Bolivia 2,390 2.3 38.6 0.47 4.9 30.6
Brazil 11,164 1.4 10.0 0.52 7.4 14.6
Chile 14,547 2.7 6.3 0.48 3.4 7.0
Colombia 7,448 2.1 27.8 0.52 5.4 13.6
Ecuador 5,367 1.7 23.3 0.48 5.5 18.4
Paraguay 3,826 1.4 22.2 0.49 4.5 17.5
Peru 5,935 3.3 21.8 0.45 5.6 13.1
Uruguay 13,949 2.9 9.7 0.39 1.5 8.7
Venezuela 7,926 0.3 33.1 0.40 4.6 12.9
Sources: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2017), Inter-
American Development Bank (2017), World Bank (2017), and national
statistics offices.
Notes: aIn 2010 US dollars; bAnnual average, 1996 – 2015; c% of people below the poverty
line; dAs % of people aged 15 and older; ePer 1,000 births.
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Figure A.1: Economic Growth in South America, 1996 – 2015
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Note: The figure plots the average growth rates of the ten South American countries over the
(almost) two decades covered in our analysis. The period between 1996 and 1998 includes the years
from the beginning of our study up until the effects of the Asian and Russian financial crises rippled
across the region (Roberts, 2008). The effects of these crises were mainly felt between 1999 and
2003. After that, South America went through one of the most buoyant periods in its recent history
(Co´rdova and Seligson, 2009), fostered by improved terms of trade, favorable access to credit, high
commodity prices and a strong world economy. The global credit and financial meltdown of 2008
brought this “panglossian period” (Izquierdo and Talvi, 2009: 5) to an end.
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B. Coding and sources for the variables included
in the analysis
Dependent variables – Source: Latinobarometer Surveys, 1996 – 2015.
Trust in political actors and institutions : Question wording (coding between
parentheses): “Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in
each of the following groups/institutions. Would you say you have (4) a lot, (3)
some, (2) a little, or (4) no trust?” Institutions considered in the analysis: the Na-
tional Government, the President, the National Congress, the Political Parties, the
Judiciary, and the Military.
Satisfaction with democracy : Question wording: “In general, would you say you
are very satisfied, quite satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the
working of the democracy in (country)?” Response alternatives (coding between
parentheses): (4) “very satisfied,” (3) “quite satisfied,” (2) “not very satisfied,” and
(3) “not at all satisfied.”
Preference for democracy : Question wording: “With which of the following state-
ments do you agree most?” Response alternatives (coding between parentheses): (a)
“Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government;” (b) “Under some circum-
stances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one;” (c) “For
people like me, it doesn’t matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic
regime.” Responses recoded as 1 if option (a) was selected, and 0 otherwise.
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Explanatory variables
Individual-level covariates – Source: Latinobarometer Surveys, 1996 – 2015.
National Economy (Perception): Question wording: “Do you consider the coun-
try’s present economic situation to be better, a little better, the same, a little worse
or much worse than 12 months ago?” Response alternatives (coding between paren-
theses): (5) “much better,” (4) “a little better,” (3) “the same,” (2) “a little worse,”
(1) “much worse.”
Personal Finances : Question wording: “Do you consider your economic situation
and that of your family to be much better, a little better, about the same, a little
worse or much worse than 12 months ago?” Response alternatives (coding between
parentheses): (5) “much better,” (4) “a little better,” (3) “the same,” (2) “a little
worse,” (1) “much worse.”
Job (Unemployment) Concerns : Question wording: “How concerned would you say
you are that you will be left without work or unemployed during the next 12 months?
Or don’t you have a job?” Response alternatives (coding between parentheses): (4)
“very concerned,” (3) “concerned,” (2) “a little concerned,” (1) “not at all concerned.”
Unemployed (Employment Status): 1 if respondent is “temporarily out of work,”
0 otherwise.
Ideological Distance to Incumbent : Absolute value of the difference between re-
spondents’ ideology (self-placement on the 0-10 left-right scale) and the ideology of
the incumbent party. Party ideologies were computed from Baker (2016), and rescaled
to the 0-10 range to match individuals’ self-placement.
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Ideology (left wing): Based on survey participant’s self-placement on the left-right
(0-10) ideological scale. Responses were recoded as 1 if self-placement lower than 6
(i.e. left of ideology spectrum), 0 otherwise.
Inter-personal Trust : Question wording: “Generally speaking, would you say that
you can trust most people, or that you can never be too careful when dealing with
others?” Response alternatives (coding between parentheses): (1) “one can trust
most people,” (0) “one can never be too careful when dealing with others.”
Education: 17-point scale. Categories: (1) without education, (2) one year of
formal education, (3) two years, (4) three years, (5) four years, (6) five years, (7) six
years, (8) seven years, (9) eight years, (10) nine years, (11) ten years, (12) eleven
years, (13) twelve years (complete secondary education), (14) incomplete technical
training, (15) complete technical training, (16) incomplete university, (17) completed
university.
(Additional controls)
Age, in years.
Female: 1 if the respondent is female, 0 otherwise.
Income: Income proxy based on the number of durable goods owned by respon-
dents’ family and access to basic public services: car, home, computer, phone at
home, refrigerator, TV, washing machine, hot water, running water, sewer. Ranges
from 0 to 10.
Media Use: Sum of number of days spent: (a) watching political news on public
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TV; (b) reading political news in a newspaper; and (c) listening to political news on
the radio, divided by 3.
Contextual (country-year) predictors.
Freedom House: Mean combined score for political rights and civil liberties. The
scores for political rights and civil liberties were first reversed so as to give higher
values to country-years with better political rights a civil liberties ratings. As an al-
ternative, we used the POLITY Combined Polity Score , with no substantive change
in the results reported in the main text. Sources: Freedom House (2017) and Polity
IV Project (2016).
Disproportionality : Measured using the Gallagher (least squares) Index, which
reflects an electoral system’s relative disproportionality between votes received by
the competing parties and seats allotted in a legislature (Gallagher, 1991). Higher
values of the Gallagher Index indicate a greater disparity between votes and seats,
i.e., that elections have produced more disproportional outcomes. A Gallagher score
of 0 would indicate that the election produced perfectly proportional outcomes.
Sources: Gallagher (2016) and Gandrud (2015), updated for the latest elections in
each South American country using vote returns obtained from the Political Database
of the Americas (http://pdba.georgetown.edu/), Adam Carr’s Election Archive
(http://psephos.adam-carr.net/), and national election authorities.
Party System Institutionalization: Measured using the Party institutionalization
index (v2xps part) built by the Varieties of Democracy Project. This index captures
several attributes of the political parties in each country-year, including the level and
depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters
within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting
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among representatives within the legislature. Higher scores on the index indicate a
more institutionalized party system. Source: V-Dem, Varieties of Democracy (2017).
Average Party Age: Average age of parties in the system. Source: Cesi, Keefer,
and Scartascini (2016).
Effective Number of Parties (ENP): Computed for each election using Laakso and
Taagepera (1979)’s formula. Source: Vote returns for each country-year obtained from
the Political Database of the Americas (http://pdba.georgetown.edu/), Adam
Carr’s Election Archive (http://psephos.adam-carr.net/), and national election
authorities.
GDP Growth: Rate of growth of the total annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
at constant (2010) prices in dollars. Source: Economic Commission for Latin Ameri-
can and the Caribbean (2017).
GDP per capita: Total annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at con-
stant (2010) prices in dollars. Source: Economic Commission for Latin American and
the Caribbean (2017).
Unemployment : Unemployment rate, both sexes. Source: Economic Commission
for Latin American and the Caribbean (2017). For Bolivia, the information was com-
plemented with data from the Ministry of Economics and Finance (2011).
Inflation: Variations in the consumer prices index general level, annual average.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (2017).
Poverty : Percentage of the population living below the national poverty line.
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (2017). For
Argentina, official statistics were supplemented with data from Di Santi (2016) and
the Catholic University of Argentina (2017).
Gini coefficient : Sources: Economic Commission for Latin American and the
Caribbean (2017), Inter-American Development Bank (2017) and World Bank (2017),
complemented with data from Amarante and Vigorito (2006), Arguello, Lemus and
Sa´nchez (2007), the Catholic University of Argentina (2017), the Ministry of Popular
Planning of Venezuela (2015), the National Statistics Institute of Uruguay (2016),
and SUMATE (2016).
Welfare Policy : Sum of government spending on health, education and social pro-
tection, as a percentage of the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For robustness,
we also fitted models including government spending on each of these items (health,
education or social protection) separately as indicators of welfare policy, without af-
fecting the results reported in Section 5 of the paper. Source: Economic Commission
for Latin American and the Caribbean (2017).
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C. Additional Estimation Results
C.1 Supplementary Figures
Figures A.2-A.4 below allow assessing the appropriateness of assuming that the un-
derlying measures of diffuse and specific support can be represented as taking discrete
values, comparing the results produced by a latent class model with two binary la-
tent classes vis-a`-vis those produced by an analogous factor analytical model placing
respondents along two continuous latent dimensions. Figure A.5 reports the (survey)
item factor loadings estimated from this factor analytical model.
Results found using the discrete and continuous latent approaches were qualita-
tively very similar, even though the latter approach imposes no restrictions on either
the number of support types present in the data or on their characteristics. As shown
in Figure A.2, individuals estimated to have high values of diffuse/specific support
by the factor analytical model were systematically classified into the corresponding
high-level categories by the latent class model. Likewise, Figures A.3 and A.4 show
that individuals classified as having high levels of diffuse/specific support by the la-
tent class model were consistently assigned higher values of diffuse/specific support
along the respective continuous dimensions. This suggests that the latent class model
behaved as if the algorithm was able to identify a natural cutoff along underlying
attitudes, splitting the data in a non-arbitrary and data-driven manner. These results
therefore provide empirical validation for our theoretically-derived groupings.
The remaining figures (A.6 - A.9) supplement the results reported in Section 5
of the manuscript. In particular, Figure A.6 plots country-level correlations between
diffuse and specific support, complementing the information presented in Figure 3 of
the paper. Figure A.7, in turn, plots the expected change in the probabilities of type
assignment associated with a change in additional socio-demographic controls (age,
gender, income, media use), supplementing the information summarized in Figure
5 of the main text. Finally, Figures A.8 and A.9 summarize the evolution of the
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four types of political support in each of the Andean and Southern Cone countries
considered in our analysis, complementing the information in Figure 6 of the paper.
Figure A.2: Relationship between continuous traits and discrete classifications
Note: The plot depicts the relationship between the estimated diffuse and specific continuous latent
traits for each respondent in our sample, and the percentage of the time that each respondent was
classified as having a high diffuse (upper panel) and high specific (lower panel) support by our latent
class model.
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Figure A.3: Distribution of Diffuse Trait Among Individuals Classified as Having High/Low
Scores on the Diffuse Dimension of our Latent Class Model
Note: The plot depicts the distribution of continuous diffuse latent traits (estimated using a factor
analytical model without imposing restrictions on the number or characteristics of support types)
for individuals classified by our latent class model as having high (upper pane) and low (lower panel)
scores on the diffuse dimension. Vertical lines indicate the average value of the diffuse latent trait
calculated over all individuals with high/low scores on the discrete diffuse dimension.
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Figure A.4: Distribution of Specific Trait Among Individuals Classified as Having High/Low
Scores on the Specific Dimension of our Latent Class Model
Note: The plot depicts the distribution of continuous specific latent traits (estimated using a factor
analytical model without imposing restrictions on the number or characteristics of support types) for
individuals classified by our latent class model as having high (upper panel) and low (lower panel)
scores on the specific dimension. Vertical lines indicate the average value of the specific latent trait
calculated over all individuals with high/low scores on the discrete specific dimension.
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Figure A.5: Item Loadings of our Factor Analytical Model
Note: The plot reports point estimates (circles) and 90% credible intervals (horizontal lines) for
the loading parameters of our factor analytical model. These parameters regulate the relationship
between each survey item (see labels along vertical axis) and the diffuse (left panel) and specific
(right panel) continuous latent traits.
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Figure A.6: Diffuse and Specific Support by Country
Note: Circles indicate the percentage of individuals classified as having high levels of diffuse and
specific support in each South American country. Percentages were calculated over the entire sample
period (1996-2015).
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Figure A.7: Marginal Effects of Additional Individual-level Variables on Type Assignment
Note: Circles represent the expected change in the probability of assignment to each type associated
with a change in the covariates. Horizontal lines give 90% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.8: Dynamics of Political Support: Andean Countries
Note: Lines represent the proportion of respondents assigned to each support type in every Andean
country between 1996 and 2015. Shaded areas give 90% confidence intervals for the fraction of
respondents allocated to each type.
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Figure A.9: Dynamics of Political Support: Southern Cone Countries
Note: Lines represent the proportion of respondents assigned to each support type in every Southern
Cone country between 1996 and 2015. Shaded areas give 90% confidence intervals for the fraction
of respondents allocated to each type.
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C.2 Supplementary Tables
Table A.2 compares the explanatory power of our chosen model vis-a`-vis several al-
ternative mixture models with different number of classes based on various model
selection criteria (bootstrapped likelihood ratio test, BIC, AIC, AICc) commonly
used in the mixture modeling literature (e.g., Hallquist and Wright, 2014). In partic-
ular, we consider whether a more parsimonious representation of differences in survey
respondents’ attitudes towards political actors, institutions and democracy is able
to explain the observed data patters as well as our four-way classification based on
Easton (1965)’s theoretical framework. Table A.3, in turn, compares our preferred
specification to a simpler model that collapses the diffuse and specific components of
political support in a single dimension. Both tables clearly indicate that our preferred
empirical specification yields a better fit to the data and enhances the explanatory
power of the analysis.
Next, Tables A.4-A.5 complement the information reported in Table 3 of the
paper, presenting the distribution of responses across the categories of the survey
items included in our empirical analysis among individuals allocated to each support
type.
Finally, Tables A.6 and A.7 replicate the results in Tables 3, A.4 and A.5, but
using as outcomes four items that were only available for a handful of years and were
thus excluded from the main analysis: trust in the state, local government, the public
administration, and election authorities. These items enable us to further assess
the content-validity and robustness of our classification approach. Consistent with
Table 3 of the paper, satisfied democrats generally exhibit the highest scores in all
these excluded items, followed by dissatisfied democrats, anti-system, and alienated
respondents.
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Table A.2: Model Selection: Comparing Models with Varying Number of Classes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models Log-likelihood AIC BIC AICc
cd=0, cs=1 -237,131.7 474,740.7 474,361.4 474,361.7
(0.00)
cd=1, cs=0 -163,018.8 326,524.6 326,137.5 326,137.8
(0.00)
cd=1, cs=1 -163018.8 326,583.0 326,149.5 326,149.9
(0.00)
cd=0, cs=2 -151,059.7 302,606.5 302,219.4 302,219.7
(0.00)
cd=1, cs=2 -151,059.7 302,674.6 302,233.4 302,233.8
(0.00)
cd=2, cs=0 -150,666.1 301,829.1 301,434.3 301,434.6
(0.00)
cd=2, cs=1 -150,666.1 301,887.5 301,446.3 301,446.7
(0.00)
cd=2, cs=2 -146,378.9 293,322.7 292,873.8 292,874.2
(0.00)
Notes: The table reports values of various commonly used model selection criteria com-
paring specifications with varying number of categories for the latent variables representing
the diffuse (cd) and specific (cs) dimensions of political support. Column (1) presents the
log-likelihood for each model and the p-value of the likelihood ratio test (in parenthesis)
relative to our preferred specification (cd = 2, cs = 2); significant p-values (conventionally
p<0.05) indicate that the more complex model fits the data significantly better than the
more parsimonious one (Nylund, Asparouhov, and Muthe´n, 2007).
Columns (2) and (3) report the values of the Bayesian (BIC) and Akaike (AIC) information
criteria for each model. As a “rule of thumb,” AIC/BIC differences larger than 10 provide
overwhelming evidence in favor of the model with the lower value (see Ntzoufras, 2011, and
the references therein).
Column (4) reports the values of the corrected AIC, or AICc (Sugiura, 1978), which includes
a penalty for the ratio of the number of parameters relative to sample size that helps guard
against over-fitting (Hallquist and Wright, 2014).
All the criteria favor our preferred specification.
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Table A.3: Model Comparison: Two-dimensional versus Uni-dimensional Political Support
Competing models
Two-dimensional Uni-dimensional
support support
Log-Likelihood -146,378.9 -163,018.8
p-value, (bootstrapped) LR test (0.00)
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 293,322.7 326,456.4
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 292,873.8 326,123.5
Corrected AIC (AICc) 292,874.2 326,123.7
Notes: The first two rows present the log-likelihood of each model and the p-value of the
likelihood ratio test; significant p-values (conventionally p<0.05) indicate that the more
complex model fits the data significantly better than the more parsimonious one (Nylund,
Asparouhov, and Muthe´n, 2007).
The next two rows report standard information criteria for model comparison. As a “rule
of thumb,” AIC/BIC differences larger than 10 provide overwhelming evidence in favor of
the model with the lower value (see Ntzoufras, 2011, and the references therein).
The bottom row reports the corrected AIC (Sugiura, 1978), which includes a penalty for
the ratio of the number of parameters relative to sample size that helps guard against over-
fitting (Hallquist and Wright, 2014).
All the criteria favor our preferred specification.
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Table A.4: Distribution of Responses to Items Gauging Confidence in Political Ac-
tors/Institutions Among Individuals Allocated to each Support Type
Satisfied Democrats
Item Not at all Little Some A lot
Government 1.0 11.9 52.1 34.9
Congress 1.0 10.4 65.7 22.8
Justice 1.6 14.6 59.7 24.1
Parties 8.9 29.6 50.0 11.4
President 1.1 8.0 43.7 47.2
Military 5.3 14.7 47.2 32.8
Dissatisfied Democrats
Item Not at all Little Some A lot
Government 0.9 26.0 59.6 13.5
Congress 23.6 58.3 16.9 1.1
Justice 12.1 60.7 22.7 4.5
Parties 42.2 48.2 9.0 0.5
President 1.7 18.1 54.6 25.6
Military 16.5 39.5 31.7 12.3
Anti-system
Item Not at all Little Some A lot
Government 32.4 64.6 2.9 0.0
Congress 17.8 64.6 16.2 1.4
Justice 25.2 57.6 15.9 1.3
Parties 37.1 50.7 11.2 1.0
President 27.8 55.3 14.6 2.4
Military 11.2 40.7 32.3 15.8
Alienated
Item Not at all Little Some A lot
Government 74.7 22.4 2.6 0.2
Congress 90.7 8.2 1.0 0.1
Justice 83.5 14.3 2.0 0.2
Parties 89.7 8.5 1.6 0.2
President 67.6 22.4 7.8 2.2
Military 51.4 26.0 15.8 6.9
Note: Rows indicate the percentage of respondents allocated to each support type reporting
a given level of confidence in the corresponding political actor/institution.
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Table A.5: Satisfaction with/Preference for Democracy Among Individuals Allocated to
each Support Type
Satisfied Democrats
Item
Not at all Little Some A lot
Satisfaction with democracy 5.2 28.5 46.6 19.7
Yes No
Prefers democracy over autocracy 73.2 26.8
Dissatisfied Democrats
Item
Not at all Little Some A lot
Satisfaction with democracy 8.0 45.3 37.9 8.9
Yes No
Prefers democracy over autocracy 72.5 27.5
Anti-system
Item
Not at all Little Some A lot
Satisfaction with democracy 23.3 54.8 19.0 2.9
Yes No
Prefers democracy over autocracy 53.8 46.2
Alienated
Item
Not at all Little Some A lot
Satisfaction with democracy 38.5 46.2 12.5 2.8
Yes No
Prefers democracy over autocracy 55.2 44.8
Note: For each support type, the first row indicates the percentage of respondents express-
ing a given level of satisfaction with democracy. The second row displays the percentage of
respondents who did/did not manifest always preferring democracy over autocracy.
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Table A.6: Relationship between Estimated Types and Excluded Trust Items
Satisfied Democrats
Item Average Difference 5% 95%
State 3.02 0.79 0.78 0.80
Public administration 2.86 0.75 0.74 0.76
Local government 2.92 0.74 0.73 0.75
Election authority 3.03 0.72 0.71 0.73
Dissatisfied Democrats
Item Average Difference 5% 95%
State 2.42 0.19 0.19 0.20
Public administration 2.15 0.04 0.03 0.05
Local government 2.24 0.05 0.04 0.06
Election authority 2.37 0.07 0.06 0.08
Anti-system
Item Average Difference 5% 95%
State 2.08 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15
Public administration 2.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03
Local government 2.13 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05
Election authority 2.25 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05
Alienated
Item Average Difference 5% 95%
State 1.52 -0.71 -0.72 -0.70
Public administration 1.44 -0.67 -0.67 -0.66
Local government 1.54 -0.65 -0.66 -0.64
Election authority 1.66 -0.65 -0.65 -0.64
Note: For each support type, the table reports within-class averages for each excluded trust
item (first column) and differences with respect to the overall (sample) average (second
column). The third and fourth columns report 90% confidence intervals for this difference.
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Table A.7: Detailed Distribution of Responses to Excluded Trust Items Among Individuals
Allocated to each Support Type
Satisfied Democrats
Item Not at all Little Some A lot
State 2.1 17.7 56.1 24.1
Public administration 3.0 24.1 56.9 16.0
Local government 3.9 21.6 52.7 21.8
Election authority 3.1 18.8 50.4 27.7
Dissatisfied Democrats
Item Not at all Little Some A lot
State 11.0 41.8 41.0 6.2
Public administration 18.6 50.4 28.8 2.2
Local government 18.2 44.7 32.2 4.8
Election authority 16.1 38.6 37.1 8.2
Anti-system
Item Not at all Little Some A lot
State 23.1 48.8 25.5 2.6
Public administration 20.9 53.3 24.1 1.8
Local government 21.3 48.0 26.7 4.0
Election authority 19.3 43.0 31.2 6.5
Alienated
Item Not at all Little Some A lot
State 57.1 34.4 7.8 0.6
Public administration 61.2 33.6 4.9 0.2
Local government 57.8 31.9 9.2 1.1
Election authority 50.2 35.0 13.3 1.5
Note: Rows indicate the percentage of individuals assigned to each support type reporting
a given level of confidence in the state, in local government, in the public administration,
and in election authorities.
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